



Revisiting the Libya/Malta Decision and Assessing its Relevance (or 





In the Libya/Malta case, the ICJ held that where the area to be 
delimited between two opposite States measures less than 400 nautical 
miles, distance, not natural prolongation determines title to the 
continental shelf. This was the Court’s interpretation of the definition 
of the continental shelf in Article 76(1) of the Law of the Sea 
Convention and of the relationship between the continental shelf and 
the exclusive economic zone. In the East China Sea which measures 
less than 400 nautical miles, China relies on natural prolongation while 
Japan relies on the distance principle. This paper analyses the 
Libya/Malta decision to ascertain its correctness or otherwise, and its 
usefulness for resolving the East China Sea dispute. The central 
argument in this paper is that the decision is inapplicable to the East 
China Sea dispute because it is incompatible with Articles 76(1), 77(3) 
and 56(3) of the Law of the Sea Convention. 
 
I. Introduction 
1. The Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta)1 was 
decided by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1985. However, its effect 
has reverberated down the years to this present day. In that case, the Court 
laid down the rule that where the area to be delimited between two States 
measures less than 400 nautical miles, geological and geomorphological 
factors relating to the seabed play no role for determining title to the 
continental shelf. This was the Court’s interpretation of the definition of the 
continental shelf as provided for in Article 76(1) of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).2 (That definition provides two 
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alternative bases for continental shelf entitlement, namely natural 
prolongation up to the outer edge of the continental margin and 200 nautical 
miles distance where the continental margin does not extend up to that 
distance.) This was also the Court’s interpretation of the relationship between 
the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) under the 
UNCLOS considering that Article 57 permits all States to establish an EEZ 
not exceeding 200 nautical miles from the coasts. 
 2. In the East China Sea, China and Japan have been unable to delimit 
their maritime boundaries. This dispute is rooted in the different 
interpretations each State holds regarding entitlement to the continental shelf. 
While China relies on the doctrine of natural prolongation all the way to the 
outer edge of the continental margin, Japan relies on the distance principle. 
Reliance on these different entitlement bases yields different results in the 
East China Sea. Moreover, the area to be delimited between China and Japan 
measures less than 400 nautical miles from both coasts. In view of this, Japan 
has asserted that it is not possible to establish the outer limits of the 
continental shelf extending beyond 200 nautical miles where the area to be 
delimited is less than 400 nautical miles, and relies on the Libya/Malta decision 
as international law governing this dispute. 
 3. This paper analyses the Libya/Malta decision to ascertain its 
correctness or otherwise and whether or not it is useful for resolving the East 
China Sea dispute. It begins with a synopsis of the decision, then provides 
specific details of the East China Sea dispute before moving on to critically 
assess the decision and its applicability or otherwise to the dispute. The central 
argument in this paper is that the decision is inapplicable to the East China 
Sea dispute because it is incompatible with Articles 76(1), 77(3) and 56(3) of 
the UNCLOS. 
 
II. The Libya/Malta Decision 
 
4. By a Special Agreement signed on 23 May 1976, Libya and Malta requested 
the ICJ to state the principles and rules of international law applicable to both 
parties in the delimitation of their continental shelves.3 As Libya was not a 
party to the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf,4 it was agreed by both 
parties that customary international law governed the resolution of the 
dispute. Both parties had signed the 1982 UNCLOS and although this 
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Convention did not come into force until 1994, they nevertheless agreed that 
some of its provisions which reflected customary international law could be 
applied to resolve the dispute. What constituted customary international law 
in the circumstances though was a point of difference for the parties.5  Libya 
contended that the natural prolongation of the land territory of States 
constituted the basis for entitlement to the continental shelf. Consequently, 
when there was a fundamental discontinuity in the seabed that indicated the 
end of one continental shelf and the beginning of another, a criterion for 
delimitation could be derived therefrom. Libya further argued that equitable 
principles dictated that delimitation must be carried out in a manner that 
leaves to each party all those areas that constitute a natural prolongation of its 
land territory, without encroachment on the natural prolongation of the other 
State.6  
 5. Malta, on the other hand, argued that natural “prolongation is no 
longer defined by reference to physical features, geological or bathymetric, but 
by reference to a certain distance from the coasts.”7 Reliance for this position 
was founded on the inclusion in the then draft UNCLOS of a 200 nautical 
mile distance continental shelf as part of the definition of the continental shelf 
and a 200 nautical mile EEZ. In view of this, Malta stated that the drawing of 
a median line, every point of which is equidistant from the nearest point on 
the baselines, would produce an equitable solution. 
 6. In resolving this dispute, the Court decided that the regime of the 
continental shelf and the EEZ were linked together in modern law and insofar 
as rights over the seabed of the continental shelf are the same as rights over 
the seabed of the EEZ, then the legally permitted extent of the EEZ was a 
relevant factor in the delimitation of the continental shelf.8 And further, that  
 
since the development of the law enables a State to claim that the 
continental shelf appertaining to it extends up to as far as 200 miles 
from its coast, whatever the geological characteristics of the 
corresponding sea-bed and subsoil, there is no reason to ascribe any 
role to geological or geophysical factors within that distance either in 
verifying the legal title of the States concerned or in proceeding to a 
delimitation as between their claims. This is especially clear where 
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verification of the validity of title is concerned, since, at least in so far 
as those areas are situated at a distance of under 200 miles from the 
coasts in question, title depends solely on the distance from the coasts 
of the claimant States of any areas of sea-bed claimed by way of 
continental shelf, and the geological or geomorphological 
characteristics of those areas are completely immaterial. It follows that, 
since the distance between the coasts of the Parties is less than 400 
miles, so that no geophysical feature can lie more than 200 miles from 
each coast, the feature referred to as the “rift zone” cannot constitute a 
fundamental discontinuity terminating the southward extension of the 
Maltese shelf and the northward.9 
 
This dictum and associated ones are analysed subsequently. 
 
III. East China Sea Dispute 
 
III.A.  China’s Position 
 
7. China ratified the UNCLOS on 7 June 1996. In ratifying the Convention, it 
declared that in accordance with the former, “the People's Republic of China 
shall enjoy sovereign rights and jurisdiction over an exclusive economic zone 
of 200 nautical miles and the continental shelf.”10 In 1997, the Chinese 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs partly stated China’s position regarding its 
entitlement to the continental shelf of the East China Sea thus: “[t]he East 
China Sea continental shelf is the natural extension of the Chinese continental 
territory. The People’s Republic of China has inviolable sovereignty over the 
East China Sea continental shelf.”11 Further, in 1998, China promulgated its 
Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf Act providing in Article 2 
that:  
 
The exclusive economic zone of the People’s Republic of China is an 
area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea of the People's Republic 
                                                        
9  ibid., 35, para 39. 
10  ‘Declarations or Statements upon UNCLOS Ratification’ 
<www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_declarations.
htm#China Upon ratification> accessed 17 February 2015. 
11  Statement by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 13, 1977, Beijing 
Review (17 June 1997) 17. 
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of China extending to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the 
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured 
[while] [t]he continental shelf of the People's Republic of China 
comprises the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend 
beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land 
territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 
200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the 
territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the continental 
margin does not extend up to that distance.12 
 
8. Article 2 further provides that where there are conflicting claims between 
China and other States with opposite or adjacent coasts regarding the EEZ 
and the continental shelf, the matter shall be settled by agreement delimiting 
these zones on the basis of international law and in accordance with the 
principle of equity. China’s domestic law mirrors Article 76(1) of the 
UNCLOS regarding entitlement to the continental shelf insofar as it sets out 
the twin criteria for entitlement to the continental shelf, namely the natural 
prolongation of the land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin 
and 200 nautical miles measured from the baselines where the outer edge of 
the continental margin does not extend up to that distance. In consonance 
with its domestic law and the UNCLOS, China claims that in the East China 
Sea, it is entitled to a continental shelf extending from its coast throughout the 
natural prolongation of the land territory to the outer edge of the continental 
margin, which outer edge reaches up to the Okinawa Trough.13 Consequently, 
the Okinawa Trough is regarded as the natural boundary between its 
continental shelf and Japan’s as it disrupts the unity of the East China Sea 
continental shelf.14 As the distance between China’s coast and the Okinawa 
                                                        
12  (Adopted at the third session of the Standing Committee of the Ninth 
National People's Congress, 26 June 1998) 
<www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/ch
n_1998_eez_act.pdf> accessed 2 July 2015. 
13  ‘China’s Oil and Gas Development in the East China Sea Is Justified and 
Legitimate’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 27 July 
2015)<www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjbxw/t1284278.shtml> accessed 18 
December 2015. 
14  Suk-Kyoon Kim, Perspectives on East China Sea Maritime Disputes: Issues 
and Context: in Moon-Sang Kwon, Clive H. Schofield, and Seokwoo Lee 
(eds.), The Limits of Maritime Delimitation (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 
2013), 290. The status of the Okinawa Trough as fundamental discontinuity 
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Trough is more than 200 nautical miles, China sought to comply with the 
provisions of Article 76 regarding the establishment of the outer limit of the 
continental shelf. 
 9. On 11 May 2009, China submitted preliminary information indicative 
of the outer limits of the continental shelf to the Commission on the Limits of 
the Continental Shelf (CLCS). Subsequently, on 14 December 2012, China 
submitted to the CLCS information on the limits of its continental shelf 
beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of its 
territorial sea is measured in part of the East China Sea.15 In its submission, 
China advanced its argument that  
 
The geomorphologic and geological features show that the continental 
shelf in the East China Sea (hereinafter referred to as “ECS”) is the 
                                                                                                                                
in the continental shelf of the East China Sea is a point of contention 
between the parties. However, some opinions regard it as such. This is 
different from the question of whether or not it should be relevant to the 
delimitation. See GAO Jianjun, The Okinawa Trough Issue in the 
Continental Shelf Delimitation Disputes within the East China Sea, 9 
Chinese JIL 143–177 (2010). For examples of opinions regarding the 
Okinawa Trough as a discontinuity in the continental shelf, see Prescott and 
Schofield who write that “[g]eologically and geomorphologically the 
continental margin bounded by the Okinawa Trough is Chinese. It stretches 
seawards from the mainland coast of China.... The imperfect concept of 
natural prolongation fashioned in the North Sea by the International Court 
of Justice in 1969 is perfectly illustrated by the continental margin of the East 
China Sea.” Victor Prescott and Clive Schofield, The Maritime Political 
Boundaries of the World (2nd ed. 2005) 439. See also Allen and Mitchell who 
note that the seabed of the East China Sea consists of three distinct features: 
a broad continental shelf area which stretches from China’s coast, the 
Okinawa Trough and the Ryukyu Ridge. Donald R. Allen and Patrick H. 
Mitchell, The Legal Status of the Continental Shelf of the East China Sea, 51 
Oregon Law Review (1972) 789, 791. Without debating this point, this paper 
considers the application of the Libya/Malta decision to the East China Sea 
dispute on the assumption that the Okinawa Trough represents a break in the 
East China Sea continental shelf. 
15  Division of Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, ‘Commission on the 
Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf 
beyond 200 Nautical Miles from the Baselines: Submissions to the 
Commission: Submission by the People’s Republic of China’ 
<www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_chn_63_
2012.htm> accessed 17 January 2015. 
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natural prolongation of China’s land territory, and the Okinawa Trough 
is an important geomorphologic unit with prominent cut-off 
characteristics which is the termination to where the continental shelf 
of the ECS extends. The continental shelf in ECS extends beyond 200 
nautical miles from the baselines from which the breath of the 
territorial sea of China is measured.16 
 
China asserts that its entitlement to the continental shelf up to the outer edge 
of the continental margin is based on Article 76 of the UNCLOS and relies on 
the Convention which provides that where a State claims a continental shelf 
beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breath of the 
territorial sea is measured, the outer continental shelf shall be delineated in 
accordance with Article 76(4-6) and such coastal State shall submit to the 
CLCS information on the limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical 
miles.17 In defence of its submission, China invokes paragraph (ii) of Article 
76(4) by drawing ‘a line delineated in accordance with paragraph 7 by 
reference to fixed points not more than 60 nautical miles from the foot of the 
continental slope.’18 The fixed points comprising the line of the outer limits of 
the continental shelf on the seabed, drawn in accordance with the preceding 
paragraph 4(ii) does not exceed 350 nautical miles from the baselines from 
which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. 
 10. In light of the above, China advocates for the delimitation of the 
continental shelf of the East China Sea based on equitable principles taking 
into foremost consideration, the natural prolongation principle, which in this 
case is exemplified in the Okinawa Trough being the natural break of two 
different continental shelves in the East China Sea. China’s position on 
entitlement thus weighs heavily on its preferred method of delimitation. 
Bearing in mind that the Okinawa Trough is located at a distance more than 
200 nautical miles from China’s coast but well within 200 nautical miles of 
Japan’s,19 if the boundary line between China and Japan is drawn along the 
                                                        
16  ‘Submission by the People’s Republic of China Concerning the Outer Limits 
of the Continental Shelf beyond 200 Nautical Miles in Part of the East China 
Sea: Executive Summary’ 1 
<www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/chn63_12/executive
%20summary_EN.pdf> accessed 17 February 2016. 
17  ibid., 2–3. 
18  ibid., 3. 
19  GAO, above n. 14, 145. 
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Okinawa Trough as claimed by China, China would have sovereign rights to 
about two-thirds of the East China Sea Continental Shelf.20 China’s claims 
meet with opposition from Japan which also relies on the UNCLOS and 
international law to advance its position on entitlement to the continental 
shelf and consequently, its delimitation.  
 
III.B. Japan’s Position  
 
11. Japan promulgated its 1996 Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the 
Continental Shelf21 in which it set out its entitlement and rights to the EEZ 
and the continental shelf. In Article (1)2 of the Law, Japan states that its EEZ 
‘comprises the areas of the sea extending from the baseline of Japan … to the 
line every point of which is 200 nautical miles from the nearest point on the 
baseline of Japan (excluding therefrom the territorial sea) and its subjacent 
seabed and its subsoil.’ Article 1(2) goes on to state that where any part of the 
200 nautical mile line lies beyond the median line between Japan and a 
neighbouring State, Japan’s EEZ terminates at that median line or any other 
line agreed upon between Japan and the second mentioned State as a 
substitute for the median line. 
12. Similarly for its continental shelf, the Japanese Law provides that 
the continental shelf extends from the baseline of Japan to the line every point 
of which is 200 nautical miles from the nearest point on the baseline of Japan; 
and where any part of the 200 nautical mile line lies beyond the median line 
measured from Japan’s baselines, then the median line or any other line agreed 
upon between Japan and a second State shall be the dividing line between the 
continental shelf spaces appertaining to both States.22 Therefore the outer 
limit of Japan’s continental shelf is the median line or another line agreed in 
substitution thereof.  
13. In response to China’s position on the Okinawa Trough, Japan 
argues vehemently against regarding the Trough as the natural termination of 
the East China Sea continental shelf, holding that the Okinawa Trough is a 
mere casual indent in the natural prolongation of the continental shelf of both 
                                                        
20  Suk Kyoon Kim, Understanding Maritime Disputes in Northeast Asia: Issues 
and Nature, 23 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law (2008) 213, 
223.  
21  Law No. 74 of 1996 <http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/jap13392.pdf> 
accessed 6 October 2015. 
22  Art 2. 
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States and therefore does not have the effect of disrupting the unity of the 
continental shelf.23 Relying on the Libya/Malta decision, Japan further insists 
that the natural prolongation principle is inapplicable where the distance 
between the lengths of the coasts of the disputing States is less than 400 
nautical miles. As recently as August 2015, Japan declared that “China’s claim 
for the entitlement of continental shelf up to the Okinawa Trough is therefore 
baseless in light of international law today.”24  
 14. In response to China’s submission of preliminary information to 
the CLCS regarding the limits of its outer continental shelf extending beyond 
200 nautical miles from its coasts, Japan protested thus: 
 
It is indisputable that the establishment of the outer limits of the 
continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles in an area comprising 
less than 400 nautical miles and subject to the delimitation of the 
continental shelf between the States concerned cannot be 
accomplished under the provisions of the Convention.25 
 
Japan’s position finds support in the Libya/Malta decision. But is there any 
merit under the law of this protest? The next section addresses this. 
 
IV. Critique of the Libya/Malta Decision 
 
15. After the decision of the Court in the Libya/Malta case, Colson opined 
that, “[n]atural prolongation in a physical sense, for all practical purposes was 
dead”.26  For Charney, if a Tribunal recognises the doctrine of natural 
prolongation within 200 nautical miles from the coasts, it would be acting at 
variance with international law.27 Munton records that in a legal opinion co-
                                                        
23  Japan’s Legal Position on the Development of Natural Resources in the East 
China Sea (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 6 August 2015) 
<www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/c_m1/page3e_000358.html> accessed 12 December 
2015. 
24  ibid. 
25  Japan’s Letter to the Secretariat of the UN, Doc SC/09/246 dated 23 July 
2009 
<www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/preliminary/jpn_re_c
hn2009e.pdf> accessed 22 November 2015. 
26  D Colson, The Delimitation of the Outer Continental Shelf between 
Neighboring States, 97 AJIL (2003) 91, 101. 
27  Jonathan Charney, ‘International Maritime Boundaries for the Continental 
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authored by Vaughan Lowe, Christopher Carleton and Christopher Ward 
assessing the legality of the claim to the continental shelf from the coast of 
Australia up to the Timor Trough (which dispute is similar to the East China 
Sea dispute in terms of the positions of the disputing parties- Australia 
(natural prolongation) and East Timor (distance)- and the length of the area to 
be delimited being less than 400 nautical miles), it was asserted that in those 
circumstances, any claim to the continental shelf based on the natural 
prolongation principle is “inconsistent with international law”.28 Highet, 
commenting on the Libya/Malta decision states that ‘[t]he Libya-Malta case 
finally disposed of “natural prolongation” once and for all in its most drastic 
and dramatic form: that of “natural prolongation boundary”’.29 Quite 
pointedly, Schofield opines that ‘States relying on natural prolongation-
inspired arguments in the context of a maritime boundary determined through 
binding third-party international judicial dispute resolution should be less than 
sanguine as to their chances of securing a successful outcome.’30 
 16. When one considers these opinions, one may think that the matter 
is settled and that natural prolongation is actually dead. However, a common 
thread running through these opinions is that they are not based on an 
analysis of the decision in light of the law, but on a presumption that the 
decision of the Court is authoritative, settled and applicable in all cases. This 
in effect puts a subsidiary means of determining international law above 
                                                                                                                                
Shelf: The Relevance of Natural Prolongation’ in Nisuke Ando and others 
(eds), Liber Amicorum Judge Shigeru Oda (Kluwer Law International 2002) 
1029.  
28  Vaughn Lowe, Christopher Carleton and Christopher Ward (2002) In the 
Matter of East Timor’s Maritime Boundaries: Opinion (unpublished) facts 
reported in Alexander Munton, A Study of The  Offshore Petroleum 
Negotiations  Between Australia, The U.N. and East Timor, (PhD Thesis, 
Australian National University 2006), 194  
<https://digitalcollections.anu.edu.au/handle/1885/47992> accessed 18 
February 2016. 
29  Keith Highet, Whatever Became of Natural Prolongation, in Dorinda G. 
Dallmeyer & Louis DeVorsey (eds.) Rights to Oceanic Resources: Deciding 
and Drawing Maritime Boundaries, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1989), 91. 
30  Clive Schofield, One Step Forwards, Two Steps Back? Progress and 
Challenges in the Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries since the Drafting of 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in Guifang Xue and 
Ashley White (eds.), 30 years of UNCLOS (1982-2012): Progress and 
Prospects (China University of Political Science Press, 2013), 223. 
 Olorundami, Libya/Malta Case and the East China Sea Dispute 11 
 
primary sources of international law namely, treaties and custom.31 
Furthermore, it does not give room for the incorporation into subsequent 
arguments of Article 59 of the ICJ Statute which effectively does away with 
any idea of stare decisis by providing that the decision of the Court has no 
binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case. 
This is why Weisburd opines that “[n]othing in the [ICJ] Statute purports to 
invest in the Court the authority to, in effect, determine the content of 
international law outside the context of a particular case.”32 Bearing this point 
in mind, this section assesses the legality of the Libya/Malta decision and its 
relevance or otherwise to the East China Sea dispute. 
 
IV.A. Two Kinds of Continental Shelves and the 400 Nautical Mile Rule 
 
17. In the Libya/Malta case, the Court dispensed with the need to consider 
geological and geophysical factors in determining title within 200 nautical 
miles of the coasts of disputing States. The Court rightly noted that the law 
governing continental shelf entitlement had developed to allow States claim 
up to 200 nautical miles of continental shelf irrespective of the geological or 
geomorphological characteristics of the seabed. This writer does not dispute 
this position as same is clear from the wording of Article 76(1) which provides 
that where a State’s continental margin measures less than 200 nautical miles 
from the coast, then that State may simply claim a 200 nautical mile 
continental shelf. Nevertheless, the Court assumes incorrectly, that within a 
given delimitation area, the continental shelf is divided into an inner (within 
200 nautical miles of the coast) and an outer (beyond 200 nautical miles of the 
coast) continental shelf, and within the former, the entitlements of the subject 
States must be identical. In the inner continental shelf (which in the mind of 
the Court is primary), the criterion for entitlement is 200 nautical miles while 
in the outer continental shelf (which the Court assumes to be secondary), 
geological and geomorphological factors may play a role; and the inner 
continental shelf must first be apportioned before any consideration of the 
outer continental shelf may arise. It is this idea that led to the rule that unless 
the delimitation area is twice the length of the primary, inner continental shelf 
(that is 400 nautical miles), then a State cannot rely on geological and 
geomorphological factors (that is the doctrine of natural prolongation to the 
                                                        
31  See Article 38 of Statute of the International Court of Justice. 
32  A. Mark Weisburd, The International Court of Justice and the Concept of 
State Practice, 31 University of Pennsylvania JIL (2009) 295, 371. 
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outer edge of the continental margin) for its entitlement to the continental 
shelf.  
18. However, this position is not the law as nowhere in the UNCLOS 
can the idea of inner and outer continental shelves be found. In the Barbados 
and Trinidad and Tobago Arbitration Award, the Tribunal noted that ‘there is in 
law only a single “continental shelf” rather than an inner continental shelf and 
a separate extended or outer continental shelf.’33 Further, there is just one rule 
governing delimitation of the continental shelf under Article 83 of the 
UNCLOS, not one set of rules governing delimitation of an inner continental 
shelf and another set of rules governing delimitation of an outer continental 
shelf.34 The question becomes: if there is in law only one continental shelf, 
why then should there be a distinction between the criterion to be used within 
200 nautical miles and that to be used beyond that limit? There is no 
justification for such a practice under the law. Each State’s entitlement to the 
continental shelf ought to be determined on the basis of the fact that it fulfils 
either of the two criteria for continental shelf entitlement provided for in 
Article 76(1), namely natural prolongation up to the outer edge of the 
continental margin or distance where the margin is less than 200 nautical 
miles. Supporting this view, Legault and Hankey state that  
 
once the existence of a natural prolongation extending beyond 200 
miles has been established ... the measurement of that prolongation ... 
begins at the coast and not at the 200-mile limit. This tends to support 
the view that there is a single regime of the continental shelf both 
                                                        
33  27 RIAA (2006), 147, 208-09, para. 213; Dispute Concerning Delimitation of 
the Maritime Boundary between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of 
Bengal (Bangladesh/Myanmar) Judgment of 14 March 2012. 
<www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no_16/C16_Judgm
ent_14_03_2012_rev.pdf> accessed 6 November 2015, 108, para 362. 
Compare with Sharma’s opinion that a distinction exists between the inner 
continental shelf and the outer continental shelf. Surya P. Sharma, The Single 
Maritime Boundary Regime and the Relationship between the Continental 
Shelf and the Exclusive Economic Zone, 2 International Journal of Estuarine 
and Coastal Law (1987) 203, 224. Magnússon also argues that entitlement to 
the inner continental shelf and the outer continental shelf are different. See 
Bjarni Már Magnússon, The Continental Shelf beyond 200 Nautical Miles: 
Delineation, Delimitation and Dispute Settlement (Brill Nijhoff, 2015)137. 
34  Bangladesh/Myanmar, above n. 33, 108, para 361. 
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within and beyond 200 miles....35 
IV.B. Independence/Individualisation of Continental Shelf Entitlement 
 
19. Flowing from the Court’s mistaken idea of an identical inner/primary 
continental shelf, it declared that within 200 nautical miles, no role can be 
ascribed to geological or geophysical factors when one is in the process of 
“verifying the legal title of the States concerned or in proceeding to a delimitation 
as between their claims.”36 This proposition is inconsistent with the law because 
Article 76(1) does not contemplate equality of the geographical and geological 
realities of all States or uniformity of entitlement of States in a given 
delimitation exercise. In fact, the essence of Article 76(1) is the recognition 
that some States have a naturally wide continental shelf whilst others do not. 
In view of this, different criteria are provided. On what basis then does the 
Court make a decision to apply one criterion, namely distance in verifying title 
of the States concerned? 
20. Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties37 
requires that treaties be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in 
the light of its object and purpose. The word, ‘or’, employed in Article 76(1) 
to introduce the additional criterion of distance is defined by the Merriam 
Webster Dictionary as a word used to denote alternatives.38 The dictionary 
defines “alternative” as “offering or expressing a choice”.39 The Macmillan 
Dictionary similarly defines “or” as a word used for “connecting possibilities 
or choices”.40 As there is no evidence of a special meaning for the word “or” 
in Article 76(1), it is clear that both criteria provided therein are alternatives 
that States can choose from if they satisfy the conditions prescribed. If this is 
                                                        
35  L. H. Legault & Blair Hankey, From Sea to Seabed: The Single Maritime 
Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Case, 79 AJIL (1985) 961, 983. 
36  Italics added. Libya/Malta case, above n.1, 35, para 39. 
37  1155 UNTS 331. 
38  ‘Or|Definition of or’ (Merriam-Webster) <http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/or> accessed 16 October 2015. 
39  ‘Alternative|Definition of Alternative’ (Merriam-Webster) 
<http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/alternative> accessed 16 
October 2015. 
40  ‘Or Definition and Synonyms’ (Macmillan Dictionary) 
<http://www.macmillandictionary.com/dictionary/british/or> accessed 16 
October 2015. 
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not the case, one is inclined to ask what the value of having alternatives is, if 
one cannot choose. 
 21. The Virginia Commentary recognises the existence of alternatives in 
Article 76(1) when it states that “a coastal state may apply either a 
geomorphologic criterion or a distance criterion in determining the outer limit 
of its continental shelf.”41 Note the individualisation of a State’s entitlement 
and the recognition of the existence of alternatives in the use of the words 
“either or”. Note also the departure from the blanket grouping under one 
criterion, namely distance, as promoted in the Libya/Malta decision. Serdy 
holds a similar view. He shows that reference to the term “baselines” 
throughout the UNCLOS is reference to the baselines of a single coastal State 
not to the baselines of all neighbouring States of a particular sea area.42 
Specifically, Article 76(1) provides that “[t]he continental shelf of a coastal State 
comprises the seabed and subsoil ... that extend beyond its territorial sea 
throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the 
continental margin.”43 Note again the singularisation of a coastal State’s 
entitlement with the use of the words “a coastal State”, and the use of the 
possessive adjectives “its territorial sea” and “its land territory” in the article 
to specify what entitlement entails.44 This writer contends that to interpret 
otherwise is to defeat the object and purpose of Article 76(1), namely the 
provision of different criteria for asserting entitlement to the continental shelf. 
 22. It is interesting to note that the entire area subject to delimitation in 
the Libya/Malta case was less than 200 nautical miles. The maximum distance 
was 183 nautical miles.45 If the Court had based its decision to reject 
geological and geophysical characteristics of the seabed in favour of distance 
as contained in Article 76(1) on this fact that the whole area was less than 200 
nautical miles, it would have made a decision within the bounds of the law. 
                                                        
41  Italics added. Myron H Nordquist, Satya Nandan and Shabtai Rosenne (eds.), 
2 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982: A Commentary, 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993), 841 
42  Andrew Serdy, Is there a 400-Mile Rule in UNCLOS Article 76(8)?, 57 ICLQ 
(2008) 941, 948-50. 
43  Italics added. 
44  Serdy, above n.42, 949-50. 
45  Libya/Malta case, above n.1, 20-21, para 16; Seokwoo Lee and Young Park, 
Maritime Delimitation and Joint Resource Development in the East China 
Sea in Law of the Sea Institute Conference Papers: Securing the Ocean for 
the Next Generation (2012) 15. 
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This is because Article 76(1) clearly states that where the continental margin 
of a State does not extend up to 200 nautical miles, then entitlement is based 
on a distance of 200 nautical miles measured from the coast. Therefore if the 
whole area subject to delimitation is less than 200 nautical miles, how could 
either of the disputing States rely on a criterion other than that of 200 nautical 
mile distance? Certainly, neither of them could fulfill the criterion of natural 
prolongation extending beyond 200 nautical miles up to the outer edge of the 
continental margin. But the geographical realities in the East China Sea are 
different. In the former, the area to be delimited is greater than 200 nautical 
miles and the outer edge of the continental margin is located more than 200 
nautical miles from the coasts of one of the States, China.  
 23. Again, observe that the Court stated that “it follows that, since the 
distance between the coasts of the Parties is less than 400 miles ...[,] no 
geophysical feature can lie more than 200 miles from each coast”.46 This 
statement would have been correct if (a) it was limited to the specific facts 
between Libya and Malta since the whole area measured just 183 nautical 
miles, there being no reason to speak about geophysical features lying beyond 
200 nautical miles, and (b) if the Court had substituted the number 200 for 
400. Outside of these specific facts between Libya and Malta, the reality is that 
geophysical features can lie more than 200 nautical miles from the coasts of 
neighbouring States even if the entire area is less than 400 nautical miles as 
depicted in the East China Sea.47 The Okinawa Trough lies more than 200 
nautical miles from China but within 200 nautical miles from Japan. These 
important differences in facts make the Libya/Malta decision an incorrect 
precedent for the resolution of the East China Sea dispute. 
 24. By refusing to recognise the doctrine of natural prolongation when 
the delimitation area is less than 400 nautical miles, the Court has created the 
problem, namely that the entitlement a State has to the continental shelf is 
dependent on the entitlement a neighbouring State has to the continental 
shelf. Put differently, when State A claims entitlement to the continental shelf 
based on the distance criterion, State B cannot assert entitlement on any other 
basis, but must also follow the distance criterion insofar as the delimitation 
area measures less than twice State A’s distance-based entitlement. This 
certainly cannot be the case, for every State is entitled to the continental shelf 
independently of another State. The right to the continental shelf is a 
standalone right, and the entitlement of a neighbouring coastal State is 
                                                        
46  ibid., 35, para 39 
47  This is also the case in the Timor Sea. See Serdy, above n. 42, 941. 
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immaterial to the entitlement of another. It would be absurd to conceive of a 
State’s entitlement to the continental shelf as being dependent on the title a 
neighbouring State has to the continental shelf. Where then would one place 
the very fundamental notion of inherent entitlement to the continental shelf 
enshrined in Article 77(3) of the UNCLOS and how does one determine 
which State’s entitlement is dependent on the other’s? A consideration of the 
presence of another State and the maritime space it may be entitled to would 
only arise during delimitation; and the issue of delimitation only arises after a 
determination of entitlement. Thus, continental shelf entitlement must be 
understood in relation to each individual State.  
 25. Considering the question of inherent right to the continental shelf 
extending beyond 200 nautical miles, Ribeiro opines that this inherency 
operates whether the continental shelf ends at 200 nautical miles or beyond. 
She states that 
 
It is surely not correct to adopt a restrictive interpretation of LOSC 
Article 77(3) and apply it only up to the 200 nm limit. Such an 
understanding would restrict the scope of the Article…. Such an 
interpretation is not supported by Article 77(3) itself, because it makes 
no distinction, when compared with what is set out in LOSC Article 
76(1), between the situations in which the continental shelf reaches the 
limit of 200 nm, and the situations in which the continental shelf goes 
beyond that limit. Such a distinction would not make sense.48 
 
26. Applying this argument to the East China Sea dispute, the fact that Japan 
relies on the distance criterion should not in any way preclude China from 
asserting its rights based on the natural prolongation criterion. Each party’s 
entitlement is independent of the other’s and should command validity. 
Therefore, when the Court in the Libya/Malta case stated that as far as areas 
situated at a distance under 200 nautical miles are concerned, title depends 
solely on distance,49 this could only be true in relation to State A whose 
continental margin does not extend up to 200 nautical miles. It could not be 
true for State B whose margin extends beyond 200 nautical miles because 
State B’s entitlement is not in any way dependent upon the entitlement State 
                                                        
48  Marta Chantal Ribeiro, The “Rainbow”: The First National Marine Protected 
Area Proposed Under the High Seas, 25, International Journal of Marine and 
Coastal Law (2010) 183, 191. 
49  Libya/Malta case, above n.1, 35, para 39. 
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A has to the continental shelf. Indeed, it would be inequitable to decide that 
State B must refrain from exercising its rights under the Convention that 
entitles it to a wider maritime area just because State A cannot, in any way, 
assert a right to anything more than 200 nautical miles. Again, when the Court 
held that geophysical and geological characteristics are immaterial since a State 
may on the basis of the Convention claim a continental shelf extending up to 
200 nautical miles,50 this must be understood as appertaining to the State 
whose continental margin does not extend beyond 200 nautical miles, 
necessitating it to settle for 200 nautical miles as its allowed maximum. It 
would be inequitable to require wide margin States which have a right to plead 
the natural prolongation part of Article 76 to disregard the geological and 
geophysical characteristics of the sea bed and subsoil, when that is in essence 
the basis of their entitlement to the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical 
miles. 
 27. In this regard, writing within the context of establishing a 
continental shelf extending beyond 200 nautical miles in an area less than 400 
nautical miles, Serdy states that 
 
if recourse to the travaux is had under Article 32 of the Vienna 
Convention because the Article 31 approach leaves the meaning 
ambiguous or obscure, it would have been no less reasonable an intent 
of the drafters - and no less consistent with the available evidence in 
this regard - to require a coastal State to justify on geomorphological or 
geological grounds any extension of its continental shelf beyond 200 
miles from its own baselines, irrespective of whether any other nearby 
State could have exercised sovereign rights over the area on the 
distance criterion.51 
 
IV.C. Libya/Malta Decision on the Relationship between the EEZ and the 
Continental Shelf  
 
28. Finding additional justification for its elevation of the distance criterion, 
the Court in the Libya/Malta case referred to the 200 nautical mile EEZ 
provided for in Article 57 of the UNCLOS as a relevant factor in delimiting 
the continental shelf, quite apart from the 200 nautical mile continental shelf 
provided for in Article 76(1). In view of this, the Court stated that, “greater 
                                                        
50  ibid. 
51  Serdy, above n.42 at 400. 
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importance must be attributed to elements, such as distance from the coast, 
which are common to both concepts.”52 It based this decision on the fact that 
there can be a continental shelf without an EEZ but there cannot be an EEZ 
without a continental shelf.53 Assuming that the Court’s assertion is true that 
there can be a continental shelf without an EEZ but there cannot be an EEZ 
without a continental shelf, would it not follow that it is in the delimitation of 
the EEZ that one is to take into consideration factors relevant to the 
continental shelf and not the other way round? This is because if there can be 
a continental shelf without an EEZ, therefore EEZ considerations are not 
automatically vital to the delimitation of the continental shelf. Moreover, the 
right to the continental shelf is inherent whereas the right to the EEZ is not.54 
  29. Supporting this line of argument is the requirement by Article 
56(3) that the rights over the seabed of the EEZ be exercised “in accordance 
with” the rights over the continental shelf. Thus Article 56(3) makes the 
seabed rights of the EEZ subject to the seabed rights of the continental shelf. 
The Free dictionary defines “in accordance with” to mean “in conformity to” 
or “in agreement with”.55 This means that the reference point is the 
continental shelf regime to which the EEZ seabed regime must conform. 
O’Connell argues that the UNCLOS is proof of the fact that the doctrine of 
the continental shelf is not one that is to be committed to oblivion insofar as 
it refers the rights to be exercised in relation to the seabed and subsoil of the 
EEZ to the rights exercisable over the continental shelf.56 Similarly, Miyoshi 
notes that concerning the seabed of the EEZ, the regime of the continental 
Shelf takes precedence by virtue of Article 56(3).57 Thus it is in the 
delimitation of the EEZ that factors pertinent to the continental shelf may be 
                                                        
52  Libya/Malta case, above n.1, 33, para 33. 
53  ibid 33, para 44. 
54  Art 77(3) UNCLOS; Ted L McDorman, Rights and Jurisdiction over 
resources in the South China Sea: UNCLOS and the “nine-dash line,” in S. 
Jayakumar, Tommy T. B. Koh, and Robert C. Beckman (eds.), The South 
China Sea disputes and Law of the Sea (Edward Elgar, 2014), 159. 
55  "In Accordance with" (The Free Dictionary) 
<http://idioms.thefreedictionary.com/in+accordance+with> accessed 2 
December 2015. 
56  DP O’Connell, 2 The International Law of the Sea, (IA Shearer ed, 
Clarendon Press 1982) 730. 
57  Masahiro Miyoshi, The Joint Development of Offshore Oil and Gas in 
Relation to Maritime Boundary Delimitation, in: Clive Schofield (ed.), 5 
Maritime Briefing (IBRU, 1999), 44. 
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considered and not the other way round. If the factors necessary for 
determining entitlement are the factors pertinent for its delimitation, why did 
the Court decide that it must find the factors necessary for entitlement to the 
EEZ as pertinent for the delimitation of the continental shelf, especially 
where the parties to the dispute had not required it to delimit an EEZ at all?  
 30. Further analysis shows that the Court’s position on the relationship 
between the continental shelf and the EEZ is tantamount to the Court 
declaring, in essence, that whenever it is called upon to delimit the continental 
shelf, it would also delimit the EEZ.58 Put differently, it would always delimit 
a single maritime boundary since it relies for its delimitation on factors 
common to both zones, namely 200 nautical mile distance from the coast. If 
200 nautical miles distance from the coast is the basis of a delimitation 
exercise of the continental shelf and the EEZ, it follows that what has been 
delimited is the EEZ or a single maritime boundary. This idea is not far-
fetched when one considers that the single maritime boundary is regarded as 
an EEZ boundary. The Report of the International Committee on the 
Exclusive Economic Zone submitted to the International Law Association at 
its 1986 Seoul conference states that the single maritime boundary “is indeed 
simply the boundary of the exclusive economic zone”.59 Again, Tanaka notes 
that where an EEZ is declared, the seabed is no longer that of the continental 
shelf but the seabed of the EEZ. Accordingly, the single maritime boundary is 
the EEZ boundary.60 Sharma records that in the Case Concerning Delimitation of 
the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada/United States of America),61 
both the Unites States and Canada appeared to treat the single maritime 
boundary as the boundary of the EEZ, a position which the Court also 
seemed to take.62 Legault and Hankey also opine that neither the United 
States, Canada nor the Chamber in the Gulf of Maine case seemed to have 
                                                        
58  Prescott opines that ‘[i]t is almost as though countries sharing seas less than 
400 nm wide would be drawing EEZ boundaries rather than continental 
shelf boundaries’. J. R Prescott, Maritime Jurisdiction in East Asia Seas (East-
West Environment and Policy Institute, 1987) 38. 
59  The Relationship between the Exclusive Economic Zone and the 
Continental Shelf in the International Law Association Report of the Sixty-
Second Conference Held at Seoul (August 24-30, 1986) (International Law 
Association, 1987) 12, para 41. 
60  Yoshifumi Tanaka, Predictability and Flexibility in the Law of Maritime 
Delimitation (Hart Publishing 2006) 16, footnote 63. 
61  ICJ Reports 1984, 246 (Gulf of Maine) 
62  Sharma, above n. 33 at 204. 
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taken there to be any material difference between the law governing 
delimitation of the continental shelf and the EEZ by means of a single 
maritime boundary and the law governing the delimitation of the EEZ. They 
further add that there seemed to be a presumption on the part of the 
Chamber that the single maritime boundary concerned the EEZ more.63 
 31. In the Libya/Malta case, the Court’s decision to apply elements, 
namely distance, common to both the regimes of the EEZ and the 
continental shelf to the delimitation of only the continental shelf bears a 
striking similarity with the Chamber’s decision in the Gulf of Maine case. In the 
latter case, the Chamber decided to apply only “neutral” factors (that is factors 
not preferential to one zone to the detriment of the other) for the drawing of 
a single maritime boundary for both the EEZ and the continental shelf. So in 
the one case, the Court decides that it will rely on factors common to the 
regime of the EEZ and the continental shelf for the delimitation of only the 
continental shelf, whilst in the second case, the Chamber applies the same factors 
(though in this instance referred to as “neutral” factors) to the delimitation of 
both the continental shelf and the EEZ. A close examination of the words 
“neutral” and “common” in the contexts used in the two cases under 
reference show that there is no material difference between them. Neutral 
criteria in the Gulf of Maine case meant criteria common to both the EEZ and 
the continental shelf; criteria unaligned, unbiased, not favouring one to the 
detriment of the other; criteria equally suited to the division of the continental 
shelf and the EEZ,64 thus excluding as irrelevant for the then present 
purposes, criteria such as the geological character of the seabed because it 
gave preference to continental shelf delimitation to the detriment of the 
EEZ.65 Similarly, in the Libya/Malta case, “common elements” refer to 200 
nautical miles distance from the coast; a criterion that is shared by both the 
EEZ and the continental shelf, seemingly unaligned to either of them, and 
that excludes geological and geomorphological factors for the same reasons as 
in the Gulf of Maine case, namely a preference in favour of the continental shelf 
to the detriment of the EEZ. In fact, Churchill refers to the factors chosen for 
the delimitation of the single maritime boundary by the Chamber in the Gulf of 
Maine case as factors “common” to the continental shelf and the EEZ.66 Also, 
                                                        
63  Legault and Hankey, above n. 35 at 976–77.  
64  Gulf of Maine case, above n. 61, 327 para 194. 
65  ibid., 327, para 193. 
66  R.R. Churchill, The Greenland-Jan Mayen Case and its Significance for the 
International Law of Maritime Boundary Delimitation, 9 International 
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Judge Shahabuddeen, in his separate opinion in the Maritime Delimitation in the 
Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark v. Norway)67 stated that the only 
way to arrive at a single maritime boundary68 is to embark on a process of 
selection where the Court chooses only those factors that are “common” to 
the EEZ and the continental shelf.69 
 32. The above analysis shows that the Court in the Libya/Malta case 
created a new rule whereby States have to delimit a single maritime boundary 
whenever the delimitation of the continental shelf is in issue, in areas less than 
400 nautical miles. The Court was implying that it would always delimit a 
single maritime boundary (or an EEZ boundary) whenever it is called upon by 
States to delimit their continental shelves since it would apply factors 
common to the delimitation of the EEZ and the continental shelf.70 
Nevertheless, Judge Shahabuddeen warned that applying factors common to 
the delimitation of both zones “could involve the non-use of some criteria the 
use of which would otherwise have been required by international law were 
the Court engaged in delimiting one space only.”71 Incidentally, that is an 
exact reflection of the Court’s reasoning in the Libya/Malta case because it 
excludes the criterion of natural prolongation which international law requires 
to be taken into consideration in the delimitation of the continental shelf in 
certain instances, namely where the continental margin of a State extends 
beyond 200 nautical miles. At any rate, the Court was dealing only with the 
delimitation of the continental shelf, yet its preoccupation with the EEZ (or a 
single maritime boundary)72 led it to advocate for a disregard of natural 
                                                                                                                                
Journal of Marine and Coastal Law (1994) 1, 22. 
67   ICJ Reports 1993, 38 (Jan Mayen case) 
68  In this instance, Judge Shahabuddeen was particularly referring to drawing 
two lines that are co-incident but the substance of his argument shows that in 
reality, he is setting out the reasoning behind drawing what is referred to as 
single maritime boundary lines because he goes on to argue that this process 
of selectively choosing only factors common to the different zones to be 
delimited would exclude the factors required under international law to be 
taken assuming the Court was engaged in the delimitation of one zone only. 
69  Jan Mayen case, above n.67, (sep. op. Shahabudeen) 199. 
70  Sharma opines that the preferential position given to distance and the 
integration of the EEZ and the continental shelf raises an initial legal 
presumption in favour of single maritime boundaries. Sharma, above n.33, 
226. 
71  ibid. 
72  McDorman opines that the Court carried out the delimitation as if it was 
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prolongation or geological and geophysical factors which are the factors 
necessary to be established in the case of a continental shelf extending beyond 
200 nautical miles. This disregard, in turn, has the effect of depriving States of 
continental shelf areas to which they may be entitled.  
 33. When this effect is contrasted with the fact that at UNCLOS III, 
States with a continental shelf extending beyond 200 nautical miles rejected 
the absorption of the continental shelf regime into the EEZ regime, one 
cannot help but notice that the reasoning of the Court in the Libya/Malta case 
is a judicial creation, that places limitations on the sovereignty of coastal States 
and takes away their right to determine the rules by which they would be 
bound in their relations on the international sphere as far as it concerns the 
uses of the sea. Legault and Hankey rightly note that  
 
The reasons for the maintenance of these separate parts are well 
known. They have to do with the determination of the wide-margin 
states, those having a physical continental shelf extending beyond 200 
miles from the coast, not to surrender the rights they possessed in 
respect of the outer continental shelf under the 1958 Continental Shelf 
Convention and customary international law. These rights might have 
lapsed if the preexisting regime of the continental shelf had been 
extinguished and replaced solely by the new regime of the exclusive 
economic zone. The purpose of maintaining the two parallel parts of 
the 1982 Convention was therefore to protect the rights of the wide-
margin states to jurisdiction over the continental shelf beyond the 200-
mile limit.73 
 
34. If the main purpose of retaining separate regimes for the continental shelf 
and the EEZ in the UNCLOS is to protect the rights of wide-margin States, 
ensuring that their rights to the continental shelf is not limited to 200 nautical 
miles, then the Libya/Malta decision should be regarded as contrary to the 
express agreement of the State parties to the UNCLOS. As Antunes notes, 
maritime entitlement derive from rules that legally empower States to exercise 
certain rights over the maritime area;74 and if one may ask where these rules 
                                                                                                                                
delimiting a single maritime boundary. Ted L McDorman, The Libya-Malta 
Case: Opposite States Confront the Court, 24 Canada YBIL (1986) 335, 360. 
73  Legault and Hankey, above n. 35 at 981. 
74  Nuno Antunes, Towards the Conceptualisation of Maritime Delimitation: 
Legal and Technical Aspects of a Political Process, (Durham University 2002) 
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came from, the answer would always be that they are rules created by States in 
the form of treaties or through custom. They are not rules derived from 
judicial creations which is what the Court in the Libya/Malta case has done; 
the question at all times material must be: what rules did the States create?  
 35. Accordingly, a single maritime boundary cannot be made obligatory 
where one of the disputing States concerned has indicated that it does not 
wish for a single boundary for the delimitation of overlapping zones. That is 
why Judge Oda, in the Jan Mayen case disagreed with Denmark’s assumption 
that a single maritime boundary be drawn, as this position stemmed from 
Denmark’s apparent disregard of the separate regimes of the continental shelf 
and the EEZ. Judge Oda therefore opined that “[i]n the absence of an 
agreement between the States concerned, one cannot presuppose a single 
delimitation for two separate and independent régimes, the exclusive 
economic zone and the continental shelf….”75 He further added that in view 
of this separateness, the delimitation for each of these zones is different.76 
Similarly, Churchill states that in the absence of agreement between the States 
concerned, the Court cannot legally, under the guise of classifying factors as 
“common” to two different zones, exclude factors required by law to be taken 
into consideration in the delimitation of a particular zone.77  
36. Applying this analysis to the East China Sea dispute, it is argued 
that a single maritime boundary will not suffice for resolving the dispute 
except both States agree to it. As single maritime boundaries find expression 
in the will of States, not being a product of the UNCLOS or any other 
multilateral treaty78 it is not possible to compel a State to accept a single line. 
In the absence of agreement for a single line therefore, the solution lies in 
drawing separate lines for the continental shelf and the EEZ; specifically, 
separate lines for the seabed and subsoil and for the water column. Insofar as 
the drawing of a single line will give preferential treatment to the criterion of 
distance to the detriment of natural prolongation, which is a very important 
                                                                                                                                
137 <http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/4186/> accessed 20 January 2015. 
75  Jan Mayen case, above n.67 (sep. op. Oda) 109, para 70; Malcolm D. Evans, 
Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and 
Jan Mayen, 43 ICLQ (1994) 697, 702. 
76  Jan Mayen case, above n.67 (sep. op. Oda) 110, para 73. 
77  Churchill, above n.66, 11. 
78  Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain 
(Qatar v. Bahrain) ICJ Reports 2001, 40, 93, para 173. 
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aspect of the East China Sea dispute,79 it is unsuitable for resolving the 
dispute. Here again, the reasoning in the Libya/Malta case is shown to be 
inapplicable. 
37. The drawing of different lines for the continental shelf and the 
EEZ, though not common, has been used where it was necessary to take into 
account the peculiar circumstances of the area to be delimited. Churchill and 
Lowe note that what is equitable for the EEZ may be inequitable for the 
continental shelf because of the different relevant circumstances necessary to 
be considered in order to achieve an equitable solution for each zone.80 
Tanaka also opines that different outcomes may result from the application of 
the identical rules of EEZ and continental shelf delimitation because the 
relevant circumstances considered for the delimitation of both zones are 
different.81 In the Australia-Papua New Guinea Maritime Boundaries Treaty 
of 1978,82 the line delimiting the fisheries zone differed from the line 
delimiting the seabed in the Torres Strait; this line was adopted in order to 
recognise the important place of fishing to the inhabitants of some Australian 
islands located close to Papua New Guinea.83 Also, in the Australia-Indonesia 
Maritime Boundaries Treaty of 1997,84 separate lines are used to delimit the 
continental shelf and the EEZ. Article 7 of that Treaty provides that:  
 
In those areas where the areas of exclusive economic zone adjacent to 
and appertaining to a Party (the First Party) overlap the areas of seabed 
adjacent to and appertaining to a Party being the other Party (the 
                                                        
79  Gulf of Maine case, above n.55, 327, para 194. 
80  RR Churchill and AV Lowe, 3 The Law of the Sea (Manchester University 
Press 1999) 196. 
81  Tanaka, above n.60, 15. 
82  Treaty between Australia and the Independent State of Papua New Guinea 
concerning sovereignty and maritime boundaries in the area between the two 
countries, including the area known as Torres Strait, and related matters, 18 
December 1978 
<www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/T
REATIES/AUS-PNG1978TS.PDF> accessed 2 December 2015. 
83  Tanaka, above n.60, 338. 
84  Treaty between the Government of Australia and the Government of the 
Republic of Indonesia establishing an exclusive economic zone boundary and 
certain seabed boundaries, 14 March 1997 
<http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES
/TREATIES/AUS-IDN1997EEZ.pdf> accessed 20 October 2016. 
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Second Party): (a) the First Party may exercise exclusive economic zone 
sovereign rights and jurisdiction provided for in the 1982 Convention 
in relation to the water column; (b) the Second Party may exercise 
continental shelf sovereign rights and jurisdiction provided for in the 
1982 Convention in relation to the seabed; 
 
38. That same Article also provides for co-operation between Parties in the 
exercise of their respective rights and jurisdictions, with each party to refrain 
in the exercise of its rights and jurisdiction from acts that unduly inhibit the 
other Party’s exercise of its rights and jurisdiction.  
39. It is interesting to note that both of these cases involved Australia, a 
State that is currently the only other State apart from China that claims an 
entitlement to the continental shelf extending throughout the natural 
prolongation of its land territory beyond 200 nautical miles and up to the 
outer edge of the continental margin in a space measuring less than 400 
nautical miles in the Timor Sea. This provides evidence of relevant State 
practice that separate boundary lines for the continental shelf and the EEZ 
should be adopted where (a) the aim is to achieve an equitable solution (b) a 
single line will not lead to the achievement of that equitable solution and (c) 
both parties are not in agreement that a single line be drawn. 
 
While it is conceded that the Australian-Indonesian agreement has 
never been ratified and has in fact being superseded by the independence of 
East Timor which now seeks a different solution from the one adopted under 
the agreement, it does not take away the fact that the line of solution 
suggested in this article has previously been considered and adopted by States 
having a significant interest in the subject matter. While East Timor and 
Australia are currently undergoing compulsory conciliation85 under Section 2, 
Annex V of the UNCLOS in relation to the determination of their maritime 
boundaries, which conciliation is being conducted in confidential settings,86 it 
is not apparent that Australia has changed its long-held position that natural 
prolongation is a valid basis for continental shelf entitlement in the Timor Sea 
                                                        
85  The report of the conciliation commission is not binding. Article 7, Section 2, 
Annex V of UNCLOS. 
86  Permanent Court of Arbitration, ‘Press Release: Conciliation between the 
Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste and the Commonwealth of Australia Press’ 
2 (26 September 2016) <https://pca-cpa.org/wp-
content/uploads/sites/175/2016/09/Press-Release-No.-4-EN.pdf> accessed 20 
November 2016. 
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and consequently, that different lines may be used to delimit the continental 
shelf and the EEZ.  
 
V. Equitable Solution in the East China Sea? 
 
40. In view of the inapplicability of the Libya/Malta decision to the East China 
Sea dispute as shown above, what then would constitute an equitable 
solution? It is submitted that an equitable solution would be one which allows 
the coasts of the parties generate their entitlements in a reasonable and 
mutually balanced way.87 This is also expressed as the equitable principle that 
the coastal State should be allowed to “enjoy sovereign rights over the 
continental shelf off its coasts to the full extent authorized by international 
law in the relevant circumstances”.88 In the East China Sea, this would mean 
recognising the entitlements of both China and Japan on the basis of natural 
prolongation and distance respectively, and then proceeding to a delimitation 
of the overlapping area created by this recognition.89 This solution satisfies the 
equitable principle that the inequalities of nature be not compensated for but 




41. In the East China Sea dispute, China and Japan disagree on the basis of 
title to the continental shelf. While China relies on natural prolongation and 
seeks to establish the outer edge of the continental margin beyond 200 
nautical miles from its coast, Japan contends that the distance principle is 
applicable and relies on the Libya/Malta decision for its position. This article 
revisited the Libya/Malta case, critiquing the important parts of the judgment 
that some scholars have assumed constitute ‘gospel truths’ in the law of 
maritime boundary delimitation. Through an analysis of the decision, this 
article has shown that the case is an incorrect precedent for the resolution of 
the East China Sea dispute.  
                                                        
87  Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia) ICJ Reports 2012, 624, 
703, para 215; Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine) ICJ 
Reports 2009, 61, 127, para. 201. 
88  Libya/Malta case, above n.1, 39, para 46. 
89 GAO Jianjun, Joint Development in the East China Sea: Not an Easier 
Challenge than Delimitation, 23 The International Journal of Marine and 
Coastal Law (2008) 39, 45. 
90  Libya/Malta case, above n.1, 39, para 46. 
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42. The decision is hinged on the wrongful notion that there is an inner 
and an outer continental shelf, with the former being primary and the latter 
secondary; that within the primary inner continental shelf, the 200 nautical 
mile distance criterion is applicable and unless the delimitation area measures 
at least 400 nautical miles, there is no role for geological and 
geomorphological factors in determining title and consequently, delimitation. 
This position has been shown to be in contradiction to the doctrine of a single 
continental shelf. Moreover, the facts presented in the East China Sea 
dispute—particularly, the presence of a continental margin beyond 200 
nautical miles of one of the States as opposed to a rift zone situated within 
200 nautical miles of the coast of the claiming State—differ from those in the 
Libya/Malta case, warranting a different conclusion from the one reached in 
that case. In the Libya/Malta case, the delimitation area measured just 183 
nautical miles and only the distance criterion could be asserted by the 
disputing States in light of Article 76(1) of the UNCLOS. 
43. Relying on the fundamental notion of an inherent right to the 
continental shelf, this article questioned the Court’s reasoning that 
contemplates equality of maritime entitlements within a certain breath and 
then divergence after that limit. Arguing that Article 76(1) provides alternative 
criteria for continental shelf entitlement and each State’s entitlement is 
independent of the other, this article emphasised the individualisation of each 
State’s entitlement in the UNCLOS to prove that China should not be 
precluded from relying on the natural prolongation principle as suggested in 
the Libya/Malta decision. 
44. Concerning the Court’s treatment of the EEZ as a relevant factor in 
continental shelf delimitation, this article showed that EEZ considerations are 
not automatically relevant in continental shelf delimitation because there can 
be a continental shelf without an EEZ. The Court’s decision to apply factors 
common to both the EEZ and the continental shelf in the delimitation of 
only the continental shelf is equivalent to delimiting a single maritime 
boundary. As single maritime boundaries require the exclusion of criteria that 
would otherwise have been applicable if the zones were delimited separately 
and in view of the fact that what is equitable for one zone may be inequitable 
for another zone,91 then in the absence of agreement between the disputing 
States, a single maritime boundary cannot be drawn. In the East China Sea, 
there is no agreement on a single maritime boundary; the equitable solution 
therefore lies in the drawing of separate boundaries for the different zones, 
                                                        
91  Churchill and Lowe, above n. 80, 196. 
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with the delimitation of each zone taking cognisance of circumstances 
relevant thereto.  
45. In the continental shelf delimitation, geological and 
geomorphological factors would constitute relevant circumstances, 
notwithstanding that the area to be delimited is less than 400 nautical miles for 
the reasons advanced herein. A simultaneous recognition of the entitlements 
of both China and Japan on the basis of natural prolongation and distance 
respectively will ensure that each party is allowed to enjoy its entitlement as 
provided for under international law. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
